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Regional policy is part of development strategy in general. Since 1978 two 
development strategies are complementing and competing with each 
other in China, readjustment and reform, but both incorporate and react 
against elements of the legacy of past strategies, the Soviet and the 
Maoist.' 
In a regional perspective the most central theme for reformers has been 
to find new ways to avoid the classical conflict, inherent in former strate- 
gies, between branches (tiao tiao) and areas (kuai kuai): centralized or verti- 
cal planning, via central bureaus and ministries, according to the branch 
principle; and decentralized or horizontal planning, especially at the 
provincial level, according to the committee or area principle.' 
The concept development strategy can be defined as a correlated under- 
standing of aims and means for economic and social development. This 
paper will concentrate on economic development. Aims in regard to 
regional policy in the era of reform will be the first aspect to be outlined. 
The financial and investment policy of the state as the most central means 
in regional policy will be discussed next. At the end the results of regional 
policy will be discussed: to what extent has a deepening or equalizing of 
existing regional differences taken place in relation to development 
strategy practised? Production, agricultural and industrial, in the 29 
provincial units in the period of 1949-87 will make up the statistical basis 
for this evaluation. For reasons of space provinces in this paper have been 
aggregated to greater regions, containing provinces with similar level of 
development. 
The Regional Policy of Reform Strategy 
In the opinion of reformers a new regional economic structure has to be set 
up, the main principle of which is based on specialization and division of 
labour. A central article in the discussion of the new regional economic 
structure is that of Chen J i y ~ a n . ~  
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Chen Jiyuan sums up the criticism of the former regional policy in terms 
of two main problems of regional economic structure: insufficient atten- 
tion to the exploitation and development of coastal industry, and the ar- 
bitrary uniformity of the previously practised development strategy, ir- 
respective of local variation. According to Chen the basic guidelines for the 
creation of a regional economic structure are ))developing the advantages 
and avoiding shortcomings and developing superiority.(( Economic su- 
periority includes both the natural basis as well as the productive forces 
developed through history. 
As for the planning of regions for industrial production Chen stresses 
that a more equal distribution of industry is a rather long-term goal, but 
that the course of history shows that regional development in any country 
always progresses from imbalance to balance, and then from balance to 
imbalance. This dialectic process is exemplified by the regional develop- 
ment in the USA. 
Chen concludes by saying that national economic structure must be 
based on regional economic structure, A relative complete and indepen- 
dent industrial system and a national economic system must thus be estab- 
lished, but not at every regional level. Specializing on a comparative basis 
each region lriust build up a relatively complete economic system, but it 
must not aim for a uniform, coordinated development of agriculture, light 
industry and heavy industry. 
Key Cities and Economic Zones 
In a new organizational structure the cities are intended to play a central 
role as economic centres that will promote economic links within and be- 
tween regions. Ma Hong, one of the important reform economists, deals 
with the establishment and future role of economic  centre^.^ The eco- 
nomic centre based on a city of a certain size is the expression of a certain 
phase in the development of the commodity economy; and the modern 
economic centre is the result of capitalist commodity production. Accord- 
ing to Ma Hong the function of the Chinese cities as economic centres 
should be revived, but within the context of a socialist commodity econ- 
omy. Ma Hong's vision is that the economic centres based on key (or core) 
cities should be linked with other key cities and neighbouring economic 
regions so that an organic whole is formed as a network for nationwide 
economic activities. A central task for economic centres in forming this 
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I network will be to help to break down the barriers resulting from the 
I chanelling of administrative control through branches and areas. 
I A central task for the reformers has been to create important interest 
, groups in support of their strategy of more independence to the enter- 
I prises. The most natural allies to rely upon for the reform politicians and 
I 
economists are exactly the major cities. 
As the most important local area administrations, the key cities are sup- 
posed to have the potential to break down branch and provincial power 
and create economic networks that transcend the provincial boundaries. 
The idea is to transfer large urban plants from central and provincial level 
to key city administrations. 
One way of removing the branch demarcation lines and organizing coor- 
dination and cooperation across former boundaries is to extend city 
boundaries and gradually form economic zones or networks that cut 
across regions. As part of the effort to turn key cities into economic zones 
since 1983 nine cities have achieved an economic status corresponding to 
that of the provinces. These nine cities are Chongqing, Wuhan, Shenyang, 
Dalian, Guangzhou, Harbin, Xian, Qingdao and Ningbo. 
In parallel the administrative map has been redrawn in two provinces, 
first Liaoning, then Jiangsu: the prefecture level has been abolished, and 
the counties of the former prefecture have been brought into the economic 
orbit of the prefecture level city. 
A number of articles by economists and geographers in the 1980s are 
concerned with the regional unit which is to replace the administrative 
region for economic purposes - the economic zone.5 
The economic zone is a comprehensive production system whose back- 
bone is specialized production sectors of national importance. On the ba- 
sis of specialization the economic zone is to establish inter-regional con- 
tacts with all other economic zones in the nation, and must therefore not 
be a closed system. The integration points of the economic zones are the 
key cities. 
It is hard to know how many economic zones at the national level in real- 
ity have been formed, and to what extent they are functioning. 
The Shanghai economic zone has been established in 1982 in order to 
create an export-oriented economic zone for industrial processing. In 1985 
it was expanded, so that it now covers the following provincial units: 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi, with Shanghai as the 
most important key city. 
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The Shanxi energy base is to be developed into a regional energy, heavy- 
industry and chemical-industry base taking the region's extensive coal 
reserves as its point of departure. The zone includes Shanxi, one prefec- 
ture in Inner Mongolia, northern Shaanxi and western Henan. 
The North Eastern Economic zone was established in 1985 with the ob- 
ject of coordinating the development of China's most important heavy- 
industry base. The zone covers the three northeastern provinces Heilong- 
jiang, Jilin and Liaoning along with three prefectures and one city in the 
adjacent coal-rich parts of Inner Mongolia. 
The Greater Regions for Regional Specialization 
Both the Sixth Five-Year Plan, adopted in December 19826 and the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan, adopted in April 19867 contain chapters on the 
policy for regional economic development. Both plans divide China into 
three economic greater regions, and outlines their place in the national di- 
vision of labour. 
It is interesting that the provincial composition of the three greater 
regions differs to some extent from the Sixth to the Seventh plan. The east 
coast region of the two plans (11 provincial units) coincides exactly with 
each other; in the Seventh Five-Year Plan the central region consists of nine 
provincial units: Shanxi and Inner Mongolia in the North, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang in the North East, Anhui and Jiangxi in the East, and Henan, 
Hubei and Hunan in the Central-Southern region; while the western 
region consists of the nine provincial units in the two backward regions of 
the South West (Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet) and North West 
(Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang). 
The principles for regional economic development in the two plan docu- 
ments are the same: the wave of development is to flow from east to west, 
In the developed east coast region the emphasis is to be on know-how 
and technology-intensive industry and the manufacture, backed by for- 
eign capital, of high-quality consumer goods, including goods for the 
overseas market. The aim is two-fold: partly to gain access to the world 
market, partly to contribute technology to the development of China's in- 
terior. 
In order to attract foreign capital and advance$ technology the Central 
Government in 1979 established four special economic zones in the 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces. In 1984 China opened 14 coastal cities 
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for foreign investment. Finally, in 1988 the open economic coast zones 
were extended to cover an area with 160 million people. It was also decided 
to separate Hainan island from Guangdong as a new province and make 
it the fifth special economic zone in the country. 
In the central region the emphasis is to be on the development of energy 
resources (electricity, coal and oil) and on the production of steel, non-fer- 
rous metals, chemicals and building materials, i.e. industries supplying 
raw materials and semi-manufactures, also for the support of the eco- 
nomic development of the coastal region. The necessary capital and tech- 
nology is supposed partly to come from economic and technological 
cooperation with the east coast provinces. 
Finally, in the poorly developed Western region the emphasis will be on 
the development of agriculture, forestry, cattle-breeding, transport, 
energy and mineral resources, as well as the processing industries, thus 
creating a basis for future development. The aim of production is partly a 
higher degree of self-sufficiency, e.g, in regards to grain and consumer 
goods, and partly a better contribution to national division of work. 
Redistribution via the State Budget 
The state or national budget in China comprises not only the revenues and 
expenditures of the central government, but also revenues and expendi- 
tures of the provincial units. 
The sources of state revenues are mainly the incomes of state industrial 
enterprises, primarily their profits, and taxes levied on industrial and com- 
mercial enterprises. Since 1979 there has been a gradual reorganisation 
from profit transfer to taxation of state enterprises, a process which was 
almost completed in 1985. This change is considered by the reformers as a 
step to spur the initiative and independence of the enterprises, but also to 
increase revenues to the central government. 
There are, however, several financial sources that are not included in the 
state budget - the socalled extra-budgetary funds. These funds consists 
partly of revenues flowing to state enterprises and departments adminis- 
trating them, partly of revenues flowing to non-profit administrative units 
and finally revenues due to provincial and other local governments. 
The proportion of extra-budgetary funds to state budget revenues have 
risen from 8.5% in 1957, to 15-21% in the period 1958-1970 and then, gradu- 
ally, to a high figure of 92.4% in 1988.' One serious consequence of this 
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decentralization of financial power has been increasing local investment 
activity, which has posed problems for the central government in its efforts 
to create balance in the economy. 
Table 1,Distribution of State Budgetary Expenditures Between Central 
Government and Local Governments, 1950-56 and Plan 1989, in percent, 
Category Central Local 
1950-56' 1989~ 1950-56' 1989~ 
Economic Construction 83.8 72.0 16.22 8.0 
Culture, Education and Health 28.2 12.9 71.8 87.1 
National Defence 100.0 99.1 0.0 0.9 
Administration 20.1 9.6 79.9 90.4 
Credits and Loan Repayments 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 76.7 36.8 23.3 63.2 
' Nicholas R. Lardy, Economic Growth and Distribution in China (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 71. 
Calculations based on Wang Bingqian, *Report on the Implementation of the State 
Budget for 1988 and the Draft State Budget for 1989(( Beijing Review, 1989, No. 18, pp. 
XIV-XV, 
The distribution of state budgetary expenditures between the central 
and the local governments has been published for the first half of the 1950s 
and plan figures for 1989 (see Table 1). The principle guiding the distribu- 
tion of expenditures between the central and local governments is that ac- 
tivities are normally administrated and financed at the same level. Social 
(health, education and culture) and administrative expenditures are thus 
primarily a local matter; national defence and credits and loan repayments 
are exclusively central concern; while the costs of economic construction 
(capital construction and technological transformation) in the 1950s were 
primarily a central matter. In connection with the regional decentralization 
in 1958 and 1970-71 and with the rapid growth of extra- budgetary funds 
since 1970, there has been a shift toward local financing of economic con- 
struction costs. Investment from the state budget, which made up about 
90% of national investment in capital construction during the First Five- 
Year Plan 1953-57, constitutes less than 40% during the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan 1986-90. 
One aim of the unitary state budget is to contribute to the adjustment of 
relationship between rich and poor provincial units: revenues are trans- 
ferred from developed to backward provincial units in the form of state 
subsidies. The state budget, in monetary terms, arranges for the capital 
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necessary for the implementation of the state plan. Thus the outflow of 
I 
materials from provinces that are net suppliers of materials to other 
provinces can be measured in terms of the flow of revenues transferred to 
the central government, while the value of the budget subsidies received 
by a province gives a measure of the net inflow of materials. 
Table 2. Central and Local (Provincial) Government Shares of Budgetary Revenues 
and Expenditures, in percent. 
Plan 
Ratio 1952' 1957' 1965' 1971' 1978' 1980' 1982~ 1983' 1984' 1985' 1986' 1987' 1989~ 
Total 
Revenues: 
Central 50.5 51.8 33.0 16.0 14.8 19.6 23.0 29.0 34.9 36.3 41.5 38.2 42.8 
Local 49.5 48.2 67.0 84.0 85.2 80.4 77.0 71.0 65.1 63.7 58.5 61.8 57.2 
Total 
Expenditures: 
Central 75.6 70.4 62.2 59.5 45.5 54.0 49.9 49.4 47.8 43.1 40.9 41.9 40.3 
Local 24.4 29.6 37.8 40.5 54.5 46.0 50.1 50.6 52.2 56.9 59.1 58.1 59.7 
Direct 
Revenues 
of Central 
Government 
as Proportion 
of its 
Expendi- 
tures5 : 70 75 54 27 33 33 45 57 71 85 98 88 104 
' Figures based on calculations from provincial budgets. 
World Bank, China - Socialist Economic Development Vol.1, (Washington D.C., 1983) Table 4.3, p. 
348 and Table 4.9, p. 355. 
Figures based on calculations in China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing, 1988) p. 681. 
Figures based on calculations in Wang Bingqian, ))Report on the Implementation of the State 
Budget for 1988 and on the Draft Budget for 1989~, Beijing Review, 1989, No. 18, pp. XIV-XV. 
Calculated from central revenues and expenditures. 
Table 2 gives a review of central government and provincial shares of the 
revenues and expenditures in the state budget. As a result of increasing de- 
centralization to the provincial level since 1957 there was a gradual reduc- 
tion in the percentage of budgetary revenues gathered directly by the cen- 
tral government from 51.8% in 1957 to 14.8% in 1978, but since then there 
has been a gradual increase in the central government's percentage, which 
had risen to 38.2% in 1987 and is planned to increase to 42.8% in 1989. Simi- 
larly, there was a drop in the share of state budget expenditure allocated by 
the central government from 70.4% in 1957 to 45.5% in 1978. After a small 
rise, peaking in 1980 at 54.0%, the central government percentage gradu- 
ally fell to 41.9% in 1987 and is expected to fall to 40.3% in 1989. 
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As a consequence of the relatively more rapid drop in the central govern- 
ment share of revenues collected than in its share of allocated expenditure 
in the 1957-71 period, the central government had a decreasing ability to 
finance its expenditures from directly collected revenues. The directly col- 
lected revenues of the central government as a percentage of its expendi- 
tures thus fell from 75% in 1957 to 26% in 1976.' But since then the percen- 
tage has been on the rise to 88% in 1987 and is planned to reach 104% in 
1989. 
The decreasing central government share of directly collected revenues 
along with its relatively more slowly decreasing percentage of total expen- 
diture in the 1958-76 period, have clearly made the central government po- 
sition more difficult in its negotiations with provinces on the transfer of 
revenues to the centre. The apparently weakened situation of the central 
government has led to a debate between Western China scholars over the 
ability of the central government to adopt effective regional policies in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
Nicolas Lardy has argued that the central government, because of its un- 
weakened system of revenue sharing, has been able to transfer resources 
from more to less developed regions and has thus at the industrial front 
carried out its intentions to create greater equality between the provincial 
units; while Audrey Donnithorne has focused to a greater extent on the 
central government's reduced revenue percentage and its consequently 
weakened ability to implement a regional redistribution policy within an 
intentionally decentralized self-reliance structure, and has claimed that 
China has a )xeUular economy.ccl" 
Available provincial data on budgets, investments and industrial output 
value indicate that despite regional decentralization the central govern- 
ment has been able to carry out a regional redistribution policy in the 
1960s, the 1970s and until the middle of the 1980s when the reform strategy 
began to win its foothold on the Chinese economic scene. The background 
for this is the continued existence of the revenue sharing system. Despite 
a multitude of changes, the central feature of the budgetary planning 
process is that there is no functional connection between the size of 
revenues and expenditures at any level below the national unitaty budget, 
The more rich provinces still finance the greater part of the development 
of the poorer provinces. 
The reasons behind the changing scene in the governmental regional 
redistribution policy from the middle of the 1980s are multifold: the extra- 
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I budgetary funds are sharply on the rise, the new revenue sharing system 
I from 1980 favouring especially the more developed coastal provincial units is gradually being carried through, the central government's investment 
policy in general gives higher priority to some of the more developed 
coastal provinces, the main part of foreign investment is localized in 
coastal areas, especially in Guangdong, and finally new investment 
sources outside the state-sector, i.e. from collective and individual enter- 
prises, are mainly found in richer provinces at the east coast with strong 
agricultural and light industrial sectors, especially Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 
The reasons are thus an expression of change in strategy: more coastal 
than inland orientation. 
The new system for sharing revenues between the central and the local 
government from 1980 was accompanied by greater local financial power 
to decide over both the revenue and expenditure side of the budget. The 
provincial units whose total revenues exceed their expenditure share cer- 
tain types of revenues or all revenues with the central government in fixed 
percentages, while the provincial units whose revenues are not sufficient 
to meet their expenditures are granted fixed subsidies by the central 
government. The revenue sharing percentages and subsidies are fixed for 
five years. Changes in these rules already were made in 1982. 
In the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian a system was introduced in 
1980 where the local governments transfer a fixed, unchanged amount to 
the central government over a five-year period. These two provinces are 
thus favoured more than the provinces included in the general revenue 
sharing system. The reason for this favourable position is that the two 
provinces include the five special economic zones of China. From 1982 on- 
wards the amount transferred from Fujian was changed to a subsidy from 
the central government. 
The most important change in the revenue sharing system took place in 
1988, when Shanghai, the biggest contributor of a total of 420 billion yuan 
in revenues to the central government over the past three decades, in- 
troduced a financial contract system.'' This is similar to the system prac- 
tised by Guangdong and Fujian. Instead of keeping a fixed percentage of 
the total revenues negotiated from year to year, the city will deliver a fixed 
amount of its revenue intake, i.e. over 10.5 billion yuan annually for the 
next five years to the central government (compared to over 15 billion yuan 
in the beginning of the 1980s), and the city will share with the central 
government half of any additional revenues exceeding 16.5 billion yuan 
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by 1991. This financial decentralization means that Shanghai has to rely 
more on its local economy and market forces to supply its needs, but also 
that the central government shall lose revenues and control over capital 
construction in the biggest metropolis of the country. 
Table 3. Provincial Revenues and Expenditures, Distribution over 
Greater Regions, in percent. 
Revenues 
Coastal 50.5 50.7 65.1 64.2 68.4 65.2 62.9 60.9 59.2 
Central 44.7 43.5 31.2 31.6 28.5 31.8 33.6 35.1 36.6 
Border 4.8 5.8 3.7 4.2 3.1 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.2 
Expenditures 
Coastal 49.5 45.2 44.4 44.1 44.0 43.6 45.1 45.0 45.0 
Central 42.0 42.0 44.5 A4,7 45.5 44.6 43.8 44'6 44.8 
Border 8.5 12.8 11.1 11.2 10.5 11.8 11.1 10.4 10.2 
Note: Figures are based on calculations from provincial budgets. 
Table 3 gives a rough picture of provincial distribution of revenues and 
expenditures, as revenues and expenditures distributed over the greater 
regions (coastal, central and border) are calculated as a percentage of na- 
tional total, It can be seen that the contribution of the coastal region to the 
national total of provincial revenues has been raised from 50.7% in 1957 to 
65.1% in 1965, while the coastal region's percentage of national expendi- 
tures constantly has been held around 45% since 1957. The border area, on 
the contrary, has had a percentage of national expenditures which since 
1957 has been two to four times bigger than its share of revenues. Thus 
there has been and still is an inverse correlation between the provinces' 
percentages of total industrial output and their revenue sharing percen- 
tages, i.e. the share of the total revenues transferred to the central govern- 
ment, or, if all the revenues are kept, the share of local expenditures that 
is covered over and above these by central government subsidies. But at 
the same time as the revenue sharing rates of all important surplus 
provinces of the coastal region have been falling throughout the 1980s, the 
number of provinces receiving subsidies has been rising, from 10 in 1978 
to about 17 in 1987. This clearly indicates the financial problem of the cen- 
tral government vis-h-vis the provinces. 
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I Regional Spreading of Investment in Capital Construction 
, 
An effective measure of investment activities in the provinces is the 
amount of investment in capital construction, as this functionally covers 
both the economic and social sectors as well as all investments regardless 
of the source of financing (i.e. both local investments, financed over the 
provincial budget, direct central government investments in a province, 
financed over the central government budget, and finally extra-budgetary 
funds). The investments in capital construction, however, only include in- 
vestment in stateowned enterprises and not investments in technical 
transformation, which has become an increasing part of total investment 
in fixed assets. 
Table 4. Investment in Capital Construction, Distribution over Greater Regions, in percent. 
1952 1957 1965 1978 1980 1983 1983' 1985 1986 1987 1987' 1987~ 
Coastal 52.5 37.9 35.1 43.6 47.7 49.0 43.4 51.4 53.5 55.8 55.3 57.7 
Central 39.5 48.2 52.4 45.6 42.1 40.8 45.1 38.8 37.8 36.0 37.3 36.6 
Border 8.0 13.9 12.5 10.8 10.2 10.2 11.5 9.8 8.7 8.2 7.4 5.7 
China 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Industry only. 
Total state, i.e. capital construction and technical transformation. 
Total fixed assets, i.e. state, collective and individual. 
Table 4 is an overview of the distribution of investment in capital con- 
struction over greater regions, from 1952 to 1987. Alternatively, for 1987, cal- 
culations have been also made of distribution of both l) total state invest- 
ment, i.e. including capital construction and technical transformation and 
2) total fixed assets, i.e. including state, collective and individual invest- 
ments. For 1983 investment in industry alone has been singled out as a 
subcategory of total investment in capital construction. 
The table shows that the coastal region receives a decreasing share of in- 
vestment from 1952 to 1965, in reality until the end of the third-line con- 
struction in 1971, since then its share is increasing. The opposite is true for 
the central and border region. But it has to be added that the share of the 
border region in national population is far less than the region's share in in- 
vestment, so that per capita investment in this region is particularly high. 
In 1983 investment in industry made up 48% of total in vestment in capi- 
tal construction. Comparing the shares of the three regions in industry 
and total investment in capital construction it can be observed, that indus- 
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trial investment is much more scattered towards the interior of China (both 
border and central region) than total investment. This observation can 
help to explain the continuing spread of industry from coastal to central 
and border region right up until 1983 (see later section). 
If total state investment is considered, the regional distribution is more 
or less the same as with capital constru~tion alone, but if total fixed assets 
is considered, i.e, inclusive of collective and individual investment, then 
the picture is different: the coastal region is winning a higher share, (espe- 
cially the East region with much light industry, certainly not the heavy in- 
dustry dominated North East region), and the border region is winning a 
smaller. 
Results of Regional Policy 
It is only for reasons of space that the aggregation of provinces in the tradi- 
tional greater regions: coastal, central and border has been chosen as basis 
for the evaluation of regional changes in production 1949-1987 (see Tables 
5-7). Many important details will thus be let out, e.g. between the heavy in- 
dustry dominated North East and the more light industry dominated East 
region. The development of the backward South West will also disappear 
as it is part of the central region. 
The coastal region consists of 11 provincial units at the east coast belong- 
ing to the most developed part of China: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Fujian, Guangdong and 
Guangxi. The border region consists of 6 sparsely populated provincial 
units with many national minorities along the western and northern front- 
iers: Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, QinghaLXinjiang and Tibet. The 
central region of 12 provincial units is situated in between the coastal and 
border regions (see map). 
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Table 5. The Distribution of Agricultural Production and Population in the 
Greater Regions, in percent. 
GVAO, incl. 
village industry3 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
GVAO, excl. 
village industry4 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
GVIO, village 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
Grain prod. tons 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
Cotton prod. tons 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
Population 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
1979 for village industry. 
1981 for agriculture, exclusive village industry, and for village industry. 
3 1949-1957: in 1952 prices. 1978-1980: in 1970 prices. 1983-1985: in 1980 prices. 
1986-1987: in current prices. 
1980-1987: in 1980 prices. 
Figures are based on calculations from provincial statistics. 
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Table 6. The Distribution of Industrial Production over Greater Regions, in percent. 
1949 1952 1957 1965 1970' 1978' 19803 1983 1985 1986 1987 
GVIO (excl. village ind.)4 
Coastal 69.3 69.0 65.6 62.9 63.1 60.9 61.6 59.6 60.4 60.7 61.1 
Central 28.6 29.1 31.8 32.8 32.2 34.7 34.4 36.4 35.7 35.4 35.1 
Border 2.1 1.9 2.6 4.3 4.7 4.4 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 
GVLIO (excl. village ind.)4 
Coastal 71.5 66.3 67.3 68.2 64.5 65.2 64.4 65.2 65.3 65.8 
Central 32.4 32.1 32.7 31.9 31.8 31.3 
Border 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Township and village enterprises; total; income 
Coastal 64.1 68.4 68.8 70.6 71.5 72.4 
Central 33.4 29.8 29.5 27.6 26.9 26.1 
Border 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 
steel5 
Coastal 85.5 85.8 82.7 72.5 68.3 62.7 60.1 57.9 56.5 58.6 58.8 
Central 14.5 14.1 17.0 24.2 32.8 35.3 37.3 38.3 36.3 35.7 
Border 0.0 0.1 0.3 3.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.5 
Chemical ~ertilizers~ 
Coastal 100.0 99.8 87.8 51.4 52.8 49.0 48.3 45.2 42.7 43.2 43.2 
Central 0.0 0.2 12.2 42.3 48.1 49.3 51.8 53.9 53.2 53.1 
Border 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.9 2.4 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.7 
coal5 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
Electric power6 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
cloth7 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
~ i c ~ c l e s '  
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
Television Sets 
Coastal 
Central 
Border 
' 1975 for TV-Sets. 1979 for township and village enterprises. 
1981 for township and village enterprises. 
4 1949-1957: in 1952 prices. 1965-1970: in 1957 prices. 1978-1980:) in 1970 prices. 1983-1987: 
in 1980 prices. 
In tons. In kilowatt hours. In metres. In units. In sets. 
Figures are based on calculations from provincial statistics. 
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Table 7. Number of Producing Provincial Units. 
1949 1952 1957 1965 1978 1980 1983 1985 1987 
Steel 12 15 17 26 28 28 28 28 28 
Chemical Fertilizers 2 4 10 27 29 28 28 28 28 
Coal 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Electricity 28 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Cloth 26 26 26 27 28 28 28 28 28 
Bicycles 3 4 5 7 22 23 26 24 24 
Television Sets 0 0 0 3 26 25 26 26 26 
Xinjiang Uygur A.R. 
Agriculture 
Concerning agriculture the following indicators has been chosen: agricul- 
tural gross output value, both inclusive and exclusive of village industry, 
as an expression of total output from agriculture, the gross output value of 
village industry alone, grain production as the dominant basic foodstuff 
and cotton production as the most important cash crop. 
If one looks at agricultural gross output value, village industry included, 
one can see that there is a gradual concentration towards the developed 
coastal region: from 39.2% in 1949 to 53.0% in 1987 - a development ten- 
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dency which however has been briefly interrupted during the First Five- 
Year Plan of 1953-57. In 1952 the coastal region had a population percentage 
of 42.7% as against a rather smaller output percentage of 41.7%; in 1983 the 
population percentage had been slightly reduced and the gap between 
population and output had been widened. The opposite tendency is true 
for the central and border regions. 
The concentration tendency in the coastal region is first and foremost 
due to the rapidly growing concentration of village industry in this region, 
especially in the East region (Jiangsu and Zhejiang). The coastal region's 
percentage of village industry rose from 61.9% in 1979 to 69.0% in 1987. If 
the value of village industry output is deducted from agricultural output 
value, the distribution of agricultural production over the three greater 
regions in the 1980s matches on the whole the corresponding distribution 
of population. Not only the coastal region is gaining slightly, but also the 
border region. 
The calculated data for grain production demonstrate that grain produc- 
tion until 1980 had a regional distribution very similar to the distribution 
of agricultural output value, since grain still made up a dominant percen- 
tage of agricultural gross output value: in 1978, for example, 47.5%. But 
from 1980 on the difference grows between the regions' percentage of total 
output value and grain production (and population), which can be at- 
tributed to two development factors: in the first place grain makes up a 
steadily smaller part of total agricultural output value, among other rea- 
sons because of the growth of village industry; and in the second place the 
tendency for grain production to be concentrated towards the coastal 
region has been reversed to a spreading tendency, mainly to the benefit of 
the central region. But the border region is still having difficulty on keep- 
ing up. 
As for cotton production, the development tendency is the opposite of 
that of grain production. From 1952 until 1978 there was a fall in the coastal 
region's, and a corresponding rise in the central region's production per- 
centage; but while the opposite development was weak in the case of grain 
production, it was striking for cotton production. From 1978 the tendency 
was reversed: cotton production was dramatically concentrated towards 
the coastal region at the expense of the central region. 
The connection between development of the regional distribution of 
grain and cotton production is as follows: During the First Five-Year Plan 
of 1953-57 new cotton producing areas were developed, mainly in the cen- 
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tral region, among other places in Hubei. In the 1958-78 period, especially 
the Cultural Revolution, efforts were made to make the grain deficit 
provinces on the North Chinese Plain in the coastal region - Shandong and 
Hebei - self-sufficient in grain, which drastically affected cotton produc- 
tion. And finally, in the period since 1978 there has been intense speciali- 
zation within cotton production, first and foremost moving back towards 
Shandong and Hebei. But at the same time efforts have been made not to 
neglect grain production in these provinces. Also the border region is gain- 
ing percentages because of building new cotton areas in Xinjiang. 
The case of agricultural production can on the whole be summed up by 
saying that since 1949 there has been a weak, gradual concentration 
towards the coastal region (apart from the 1953-57 period). The concentra- 
tion tendency since 1978 is thus not a new, but a continuing phenomenon. 
This emphasizes the fact that the Maoist self-reliance strategy in the case 
of collectivized agricultural production involves a tendency to aggravate 
the regional differences by favouring the best-equipped regions. The cen- 
tralized redistribution policy is only a realizable strategy within the state- 
owned sector. Since 1978 the concentration towards the coastal provinces 
has been particularly strong in the case of cash crops like cotton and the 
flourishing village industry enterprises, which take advantage of the prox- 
imity of the big cities. But grain, as the most important basic foodstuff, has 
been exempt from this specialization tendency. All provincial units, in the- 
ory, are to aim at self-suffiency. But some provinces falling behind, all lo- 
cated in the coastal region, are being accused of neglecting grain produc- 
tion for more lucrative cash crops: Guangdong, Guangxi and Fujian. 
Industry 
The evaluation of regional development in industrial production is dealt 
with on the basis of the following indicators: industrial gross output value 
as an expression of total industrial production, the light industrial sector 
alone, steel production as the most important semimanufactures industry, 
chemical fertilizers as industry's most important input into the agricultural 
sector, coal and electric power as the most important fuel products, the 
production of cloth as the most important everyday consumer commodity, 
production of bicycles and television sets, two important consumer dura- 
b l e ~  and income from the rural enterprises, which are only partly included 
in industrial gross output value - see Table 6. 
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As far as the total industrial output is concerned there has been a con- 
tinuing shift of production percentages from the coastal region towards the 
inland region, from 1949 right up until 1983. The production percentage of 
the coastal region was thus reduced from 69.3% in 1949 to 59.6% in 1983. 
The central region had its maximum percentage in 1983 (36,4%), but the 
border region as early as 1970 (4.7%). There is, however, still an industrial 
concentration in the coastal region, as this in 1983 had a population per- 
centage of 4l:2%. The deepening of existing regional differences within in- 
dustry did not, then, restart until after 1983, i s .  in connection with carry- 
ing through of reform strategy - and only slightly. 
The degree of industrial concentration in the coastal region was reduced 
for both heavy and light industry, but light industry is more concentrated 
towards the coastal region than heavy industry, and the degree of concen- 
tration of light industry was reduced less than that of heavy industry, After 
1983 the botder region retained its percentage of light industry output at 
2.9%, i.e. only the central region became a loser. 
The geographical localization of steel production has been subject to a 
constant shift since 1952 from the coastal region towards the central and 
border region. Only after 1985 the coastal region is regaining percentages, 
but the border region is gaining still. 
In 1949 the production of chemical fertilizers was concentrated in the 
coastal region alone, but the geographical localization has since then 
favoured the central and border regions. After 1985 the coastal region is 
gaining small percentages, but this is also the case with the border region. 
The regional localization corresponds, apart from the border region, on 
the whole with the regional distribution of population - and grain produc- 
tion. With the starting up of the imported nitrogen fertilizer plants in Xin- 
jiang and Ningxia the border region's percentage will continue to rise. 
Coal was the only one of the products included that was produced more 
in the central than in the coastal region in 1949. Since 1949, and escpecially 
since 1978 the production of coal has to an even greater extent been concen- 
trated towards the central region (especially Shanxi) and the border 
region. The localization of the coalmines has thus been adapted more and 
more to the sites of coal deposits. The localization of coal production also 
underscores the coastal region's weak energy resource basis. 
The regional distribution of electric power in 1949 in the coastal and cen- 
tral regions corresponded very precisely with the distribution of total in- 
dustrial output in these regions, After 1949, and right up until 1987, the 
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central and border regions' production percentages grew steadily. In 1987, 
I 
I power production was considerably more even distributed regionally than the corresponding regional distribution of industrial output. This empha- 
sizes the shortage of energy supplies in the coastalregion, making for poor 
utilization of industrial capacity. 
Light industry production was and still is, as far as most products are 
concerned, considerably more concentrated towards the coastal region 
than heavy industry in general. The coastal region's production percen- 
tage for cloth in 1949 was as high as 82%. In 1987, however, its percentage 
of 58.5% was smaller than its percentage of total industrial output value 
(61.1%). But the coastal region began to regain percentages already after 
1983. 
In 1949 the production of bicycles was concentrated in three assembly 
factories in the coastal region. The production of television sets, which 
started on a small scale in 1958, was up to 1965 entirely concentrated in the 
coastal region. Since 1978 there has been a considerable spread of the 
strongly coast-concentrated production of both to the central region, and 
the beginnings of a spread to the border region, especially for television 
sets. This spread is continuing after 1985 for bicycles, but not for television 
sets. 
As to the total income of xiang and village enterprises the production 
percentage of the coastal region was the only one of the types of produc- 
tion selected to concentrate already from 1978. The rural enterprises are 
more concentrated towards the developed provincial units of the coastal 
region than industrial production as such, especially towards the East 
region (Jiangsu and Zhejiang). 
The case of industry in different strategic periods can be summed up as 
follows. The priority given to heavy industry in 1953-78 did not only 
benefit the traditional heavy industry centres in the North East, but also 
new centres in the interior of China - i.e. provincial units in the central 
region: Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and 
Shaanxi as well as in the border region: Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 1978 the heavy industry production per- 
centage was particularly high, i.e. over 65%, in Heilongjiang and Liaoning 
in North East, Shanxi in North, Guizhou and Tibet in South West and 
Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai in North West. Of the provincial units men- 
tioned that were dominated by heavy industry, all except the northeastern 
provinces, managed to increase their production percentages of total gross 
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output value between 1952 and 1978. 
The impact of the readjustment strategy 1979-83 meant higher priorities 
for light industry at the expense of heavy industry, and thus a new situa- 
tion for the provincial units dominated by heavy industry. Those provin- 
cial units that also had relatively well developed light industry improved 
their production percentage of national light industry between 1978 and 
1983 (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan and Yunnan). A 
few provincial units increased their production percentage of national 
heavy industry, first and foremost because of high priority given to the de- 
velopment of local energy resources (Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan, 
Hubei, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Xinjiang). 
But a few of the provincial units dominated by heavy industry were in a 
weak position with the shift in strategy after 1978 - the poorly developed 
provincial units in the North West, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai, along 
with Tibet in South West. The heavy industry sector is dominated by rela- 
tively large state owned-factories, often producing at a loss. The bulk of 
these factories are concentrated in a few dominant cities, with poor link- 
ages to the rest of the economy. In the 1979-83 period these four provihcial 
units had fhe lowest growth rate of all provinces. These four provincial 
units have plentiful energy resources, especially hydropower and are 
therefore a potential surplus area for electric power. A potentially more 
succes ful development strategy in these provincial units is also latent in 
the development of local industry, among other places in national 
minority areas, based on craft-orientated consumer goods industry. Such 
a restructuring would take longer time than in other provinces. 
During the years of reform after 1983 the readjustment of the industrial 
structure stabilized, as heavy industry had the same percentage of na- 
tional industrial output, i.e. about 50%. It is interesting that, for the bulk 
of the industrially developed provinces, the heavy industry percentage 
either stayed at the same level as in 1983 or slightly increased, while the 
readjustment of the industrial structure towards more light industry con- 
tinued for most of the undeveloped provinces and those dominated by 
heavy industry, for example in Inner Mongolia in North, Gansu and Ning- 
xia in North West and Guizhou in South West. The ever improving light in- 
dustry situation in these weakly developed provinces may in the rather 
longer term help to improve the basis for the provinces' own accumula- 
tion, and thus make for a higher rate of growth. If the growth rates are com- 
pared in the 1979-83 and 1984-87 periods, it can be observed that there is 
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i a striking improvement for all four provincial units. The restructuring is 
I 
I 
i thus already having its effect. 
As can be seen from Table 7 regional specialization is almost non existent 
in the Chinese economy. In 1983 the industrial products included in this 
paper were produced in at least 26 of the 29 provincial units. This indus- 
trial spread, unique in the international context, has happened despite the 
clear economic advantages connected with regional specialization and 
commodity exchange. The Chinese economic planning system has 
favoured local self-reliance at the provincial level, strongly backed by cen- 
tralized redistribution, even after 1978, when regional specialization was 
on the agenda. Thus the number of provinces, for example, that produce 
bicycles has risen from 22 in 1978 to 26 in 1983. The advantages of regional 
specialization have been debated theoretically, but it was not until the 
1980s that the number of factories in certain commodity categories was ad- 
justed, and the reduction of factories has generally taken place very slowly 
and to a limited extent. In the course of 1985, for example, the number of 
bicycle producing provinces was reduced from 26 to 24. 
In the near future reforms will slow down. Calling the natural allies of 
the reform strategy, i.e. leaders of the big cities, to the center, as happened 
after the events in Beijing in early June in the case of Jiang Zemin from 
Shanghai and Li Ruihuan from Tianjin, will weaken the reform faction wi- 
thin the party leadership. Therefore, China's regional structure will not see 
any big changes in the next years to come. 
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